Introduction
Marxist philosophical materialism forms the theoretical foundation on which Marxist thought rests. It stands directly opposed to idealism on three fronts — the nature of reality, the relationship between matter and mind, and the knowability of the world. These three features, taken together, define how Marxism understands nature and, by extension, society.
 |
| Karl Marx |
1. Contrary to Idealism — which regards the world as the embodiment of, and comprised of, absolute ideas, Marxist philosophical materialism holds that the world, by its very nature, is material — and that the multifold phenomena of the world constitute different forms of matter or substance in motion. The interconnection and interdependence of these phenomena, as established by the dialectical method, constitute the law of development of moving matter, and the world develops in accordance with this law of movement.
2. Contrary to Idealism — which asserts, or maintains, that only our minds really exist, and that the material world and nature exist only within our minds, our sensations, our ideas, and our perceptions — Marxist materialist philosophy holds that matter, nature, or being is an objective reality, existing outside and independent of our minds. Matter or substance is primary, since it is the source of sensation, ideas, and mind, while mind is secondary and derivative, being a reflection of matter and of being. Thought is a product of matter in its development and can reach a higher degree of perfection through the brain — the brain being the organ of thought. One cannot, therefore, separate thought from matter without committing a grave error.
3. Contrary to Idealism — which denies the possibility of knowing the world and its laws, does not believe in the authenticity of our knowledge, does not recognise objective truth, and holds that the world is full of "things in themselves" that can never be known by science — Marxist philosophical materialism holds that the world and its laws are fully knowable, and that our knowledge of the laws of nature, tested by experiment and practice, is authentic knowledge with the validity of objective truth. There are no things in the world which are unknowable, only things which are not yet known but which will be disclosed through the efforts of science and practice.
The extension of the principles of philosophical materialism to the study of social life is extremely important, particularly in their application to the history of society. If the connection and interdependence between the phenomena of nature are laws of the development of nature, it follows that the connection and interdependence of the phenomena of social life, and the laws of the development of society, are not accidental. Social life and the history of society therefore cease to be a collection of accidents and instead become the history of the development of society according to regular laws — making the study of the history of society a science. Again, if the world is knowable, and our knowledge of the laws of development is authentic knowledge with the validity of objective truth, then it follows that social life and the development of society are equally knowable, and that scientific data regarding the laws of development of society carry the same validity as objective truth. In other words, the science of the history of society, despite all the complexities of social phenomena, can become as precise as biology or any other physical science, and capable of putting the laws of social development to practical use.
Conclusion
These three features — the material and dynamic nature of the world, the primacy of matter over mind, and the full knowability of the world and its laws — together define Marxist philosophical materialism's break from idealism. Their extension to social life is what transforms the study of history and society from a record of accidents into a science governed by discoverable laws.
0 Comments